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Abstract
Taxing internationally mobile factors of production has been dismissed as an
inefficient means of raising tax revenue. This paper addresses the question
of whether it is efficient to tax capital at source when labor markets and the
taxation of lumpsum income suffer from imperfections. Four reasons for
taxing capital are identified: (i) institutional constraints rendering any taxation
of profit income infeasible; (ii) market power in the demand for labor; (iii)
market power in the supply of labor if it increases with the employment of
capital; (iv) unemployment benefits that are not tied to net real wages. It is
argued that the case for taxing capital is not particularly strong. By
reinterpreting capital as energy the results are applicable to the discussion
about ecological tax reforms.
JEL Classification: H2.














There are good reasons to leave the competitive rewards to internationally mobile
factors untaxed and to tax immobile factor incomes like labor income instead. However,
as the discussion about ecological tax reforms shows, the political debate about the
taxation of internationally traded factors is still ongoing. Advocates of green tax reform
argue that taxing energy - an internationally traded factor - and using the tax revenue to
reduce the distortions of the existing tax system is welfare enhancing. In fact, the
European Commission (1997) recommends to tax the use of energy and to recycle the
revenue to reduce labor costs, hoping to take away some pressure from the labor market.
Can this proposal be simply dismissed as being inappropriate to cope with employment
problems?  Or does unemployment force us to revise the received wisdom about the
optimal taxation of production factors?
The literature on optimal taxation has produced some strong results on how to
design second-best tax systems. In a seminal paper Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) have
identified very general conditions under which production efficiency is desirable. Applied
to the problem at hand, their theorem requires that the government of a small open
economy raises all required revenue solely through the taxation of income as it accrues to
residents. The competitive rewards to mobile factors like capital should remain untaxed.
This result stands even if immobile factors are not perfectly inelastically supplied, i.e.,
even if the taxation of immobile factors creates deadweight loss. In other words, taxes on
capital are not an efficient means to alleviate the effective tax burden on labor.
However, two conditions are necessary for the validity of the theorem. First, there
must not be pure profits accruing to private households. If pure profits exist, it has to be
feasible to tax them up to one hundred percent. The second requirement is that the non-
availability of lumpsum taxes is the only source of inefficiency in the economy.
Mirrlees (1972) qualifies the first condition. He argues, that it imposes a weaker
constraint on the theorem than one may think at first sight. It is only pure rent income that
has to be extracted through taxation. Pure rent income, however, is rare. Consider for
example an economy with internationally mobile firms. Here profits direct the locational
choices of the firms. To the extent that these profits are competitive rewards, they do not2
have to be extracted by the government for the production-efficiency theorem to hold
(Gordon, 1992). This paper explicitly considers the existence of pure rent income and
studies the implications of different income tax regimes on the optimal treatment of
capital.
The second condition seems to impose stronger constraints on the validity of the
theorem and is the focus of this paper. It can hardly be argued that the labor market in
most industrialized countries and in particular in those countries that suffer from high
rates of unemployment is perfectly competitive. Depending on the exact nature of the
problem in the labor market that may or may not be resolved through government
intervention, third-best tax systems have to be designed. Whether they follow the same
simple rules as second-best tax systems remains to be seen and is the subject of the
present analysis.
There exists a host of plausible explanations why the labor market fails to clear.
We do not attempt to argue that one theory reflects the existing imperfections better than
another. Hence, a model framework is constructed that can easily be fitted to
accommodate different labor market setups. To keep the model analytically tractable, the
rest of the model is kept at a minimum complexity. Distributional issues, for example, are
ignored in the analysis.
It should be noted at the outset that we do not study possible efficiency gains from
marginal tax reforms. Instead, we derive optimal tax systems in the presence of labor
market imperfections. The chosen modeling framework explicitly allows us to separate
efficiency losses from the payment of unemployment compensation and inefficiencies
from non-competitive behavior in the labor market. It turns out that choosing this strategy
produces surprisingly unambiguous results that prove to be helpful to get a better
understanding of the literature on green taxes.
In Section 2 optimal taxation subject to perfectly competitive labor markets is
revisited. In Sections 3 to 5 various kinds of market imperfections are introduced. In
Section 3 the inefficiency is caused by the market power of firms, and in Section 4
workers, represented by a union, exert market power. In both cases workers are not
compensated by the government for resulting underemployment. For simplicity, we
consider the admittedly extreme cases of a monopsony in the labor market - representing3
labor markets with upward sloping labor supply curves - and a monopoly union that is
setting wages subject to a downward sloping labor demand curve. In section 5 labor
markets are again competitive. The payment of unemployment compensation imposes an
institutional constraint, and we ask how alternative designs of transfer payments affect the
efficient taxation of capital. Section 6 applies the results to the discussion of green taxes,
and Section 7 concludes.
Assuming perfectly competitive labor markets, the main results are: With no
positive lumpsum income accruing to private households, production efficiency is
desirable and capital should remain untaxed (Proposition 1). For households to earn wage
income only, it must be feasible to tax any lumpsum income up to one hundred percent. If
wage income is taxable and profit income cannot be taxed, it is efficient to tax capital
(Proposition 2). Finally, with a uniform income tax in place, subsidizing capital turns out
to be optimal (Proposition 3). Propositions 4 to 6 and Propositions 8 to 10 generalize
Propositions 1 to 3. The first set applies to a regime with monopolized labor demand. It
turns out that a monopsony in the labor market strengthens the case for taxing capital. For
monopolized labor supply it all depends on how market power varies with the
employment of capital (Propositions 7 to 10). If the market power of labor supply
decreases, one obtains an argument for subsidizing capital. Looking at the design of the
transfer system, it is shown that only if unemployment benefits are indexed to net (real)
wages, Propositions 1 to 3 require no further qualification (Proposition 11). If
unemployment benefits are indexed to gross wages the employment of capital exerts a
fiscal externality, which can be internalized by taxing capital (Proposition 12). Hence it is
not simply a matter of equitable taxation to index transfers to net wages; it is dictated by
efficiency considerations.
The presented results are easily applied to the discussion about double dividends
from green taxes. One only has to interpret energy as an internationally traded factor of
production.
2. Institutional constraints in the taxation of lumpsum income4
Consider a small open, one-sector economy with three factors of production.
Labor, l, is internationally immobile but labor supply is endogenously determined by the
households. Capital, k, is a mobile factor and traded at a fixed (real) price, q. The factor k
is interpreted as capital, but note that it may well be interpreted as energy. Assume that
residents are endowed with some exogenous amount of capital k . Since q is fixed,
residents earn exogenous factor income Iq k ≡ . And finally there is a third factor, f,
which is in fixed supply. The fixed factor f could be interpreted as land, or like in De
Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) as fixed capital. Output serves as a numéraire good. The
production function F(l,k)=F(l,k,f) is linear homogeneous in l, k, and f. Since f is fixed it
is suppressed in the notation whenever no ambiguities result. Let
FF i j l k f ii ij << ∀ ≠= 0, , .  Subscripts denote partial derivatives, i.e., FF l kl l = ∂∂ (, ) / .
Constant returns to scale imply
lFkl kFkk +< 0 and FF F ll kk lk −> 2 0. (1)
Let  w  denote (real) labor cost and θ  a source-based tax/subsidy on capital. Firms
maximize profits  ( ) ( ) [] πθ ≡− − + max , Flk w l q k 1 . It is assumed that these profits
completely accrue to domestic residents. This assumption is less innocuous than it might
appear at first sight, because the existence of profits accruing to foreigners renders a
positive tax on capital optimal (Huizinga and Nielsen, 1997).
Government expenditures require to finance an exogenously fixed budget, g.
Revenue can be raised either through taxing capital (at source) or through taxing income
according to the residence principle. In the present model households earn income from
three sources. They earn wage income wl, capital income I, and profit income π .
Assuming that the government can always levy a tax on wage income, after-tax wage
income is given by () 1− τ wl, and  () ωτ ≡− 1 w denotes the after-tax wage. Let net
lumpsum income be denoted by  () ρ π + I , where 1− ρ  is the tax rate on lumpsum
income. In the following we distinguish between three tax regimes. In a uniform income
tax regime ρ τ ≡− 1  and ρ ρ τ '/ == − dd 1. If only wages can be taxed and lumpsum
income remains untaxed, we have ρ ≡ 1. Finally, we also consider the case in which all
positive lumpsum income is taxed away, such that ρ ≡ 0 holds. In this case, there are no5
constraints on the taxation of (positive) lumpsum income. Note that this does not mean
that a lumpsum tax is available. A true lumpsum tax would allow the tax planner to leave
households with negative lumpsum income. This is ruled out by assumption and the
reason why the tax system is not first-best in the present paper. With a wage tax and the
unrestricted taxation of positive lumpsum income, ρ '= 0.
Ignoring distributional issues, we let the utility function be quasi-linear with
Ucl c Vl (,) () ≡−  and Vl V l '( ) , "( ) >> 00  for l > 0. All income is spent on
consumption, hence  () cl I =+ + ω ρ π . Households maximize utility by choosing labor
supply, and the first-order condition is  () ω = Vl ' . Assuming a quasi-linear utility function
greatly simplifies the analysis without biasing the results. In fact, except for Propositions
5 and 6 all results may easily be generalized, as will be discussed below.
To derive efficient tax structures, assume that a social planner maximizes the
utility of a representative household. She chooses θτω ,, ,, kl  in order to
maximize () ( ) ω ρ π lI V l ++ − (2)
subject to
ω =    () Vl ' () λ (3)
 () 1− τ Fl =   ω () α (4)
Fq k =+ () 1 θ () β (5)







++ − + = lq k I g , () γ (6)










The constraint (3) requires the after-tax wage to equal the marginal disutility of
work. Equations (4) and (5) characterize profit-maximizing firms. Finally, the
government budget constraint is written down in (6). λα β γ ,,, indicate Lagrangean
multipliers. Note that the lumpsum tax function, ρ ρ τ = () , is no policy instrument. As
mentioned earlier, the paper differentiates between three tax regimes that are exogenously
given but does neither allow the planner to choose between the three regimes nor to6
optimize in ρ .
1 Clearly, in the absence of any constraints, the planner would choose to
finance government expenditures solely by taxing lumpsum income. In what follows, we
assume that the planner is forced to choose a positive wage tax rate, τ > 0, in the
optimum. This means that revenue requirements are sufficiently large, so that the
marginal cost of public funds, γ , exceeds one. Propositions 1 to 3 show that optimal tax
policy depends critically on the ability of the government to skim off positive lumpsum
income. Solving the tax-planner’s maximization problem gives
Proposition 1: If there is no restriction in the taxation of positive lumpsum income, 
ρ ≡ 0, it is optimal to leave capital untaxed,θ = 0.
Proposition 1 is a special case of Proposition 8 below. Hence the proof is
postponed. The result is well known from the literature, e.g. Gordon (1986), Bucovetsky
and Wilson (1991), and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b). It is an application of the
production-efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). Proposition 1 demands
that taxes are entirely levied according to the residence principle. The returns to capital
should remain untaxed at source. The reason is that mobile capital is perfectly elastically
supplied and immobile labor is not. Thus any source taxes on mobile factors would only
be shifted to immobile factors. Even if labor is elastically supplied, it is more efficient to
tax labor directly rather than to levy a source tax on capital which is shifted by market
forces. Note that factor demand elasticities are irrelevant for the validity of this result.
The effects of capital taxation on employment and welfare are easily determined in
the basic model. It turns out that the sign of θ  is pivotal. Employment and welfare may
well be enhanced with increasing capital taxes but only if the initial tax on capital is
negative. In other words, if capital is subsidized initially, it is employment and welfare
                                             
1 A fourth alternative tax regime, which has been pointed out by a referee, could be one in which profits are taxed at the same
rate as the return to capital. We choose not to follow this line because the paper is motivated by the discussion of ecological tax
reform. It is hard to argue why energy should be taxed at the same rate as profits. This is obviously different if the focus is on
capital. In fact, it is difficult to differentiate between pure profits and the return to capital in practice. A tax regime in which
π and qk are taxed at the same rate amounts to a comprehensive business income tax.  In the present model it is easy to show
that the existence of positive profits entails a positive comprehensive business income tax. This result, however, is known and
implicitly derived in Mintz and Tulkens (1996).7
enhancing to reduce the subsidy. Given that capital is taxed, increasing the tax rate,
however, unambiguously reduces employment and welfare.
Assuming that a government can tax wages but not positive lumpsum income, we
obtain
Proposition 2: With a pure wage tax, ρ ≡ 1, it is optimal to tax capital, θ > 0.
Since Proposition 2 is a special case of Proposition 9, the proof of Proposition 2
follows from the proof of Proposition 9 below. The result of Proposition 2 is in line with
Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) and De Mooij and Bovenberg (1998). It shows that a capital
tax serves as an instrument to skim off profit income that is not directly taxable.
The third tax scenario considered is one in which all income - labor and lumpsum
income - is taxed according to the residence principle at a uniform rate. To prove
Proposition 3, and later on Proposition 10, a further condition has to hold, namely
( ) Gl F k F F l Fk F FF lk kk l k lk l ≡++ − − ≥ 0.( 7 )
For linear homogeneous F (7) is equivalent to kF F kF F lk l fk f ≥ . This means that the
elasticity of the marginal product of the fixed factor with respect to capital must not
exceed the elasticity of the marginal product of labor with respect to capital for (7) to
hold. In other words, the elasticity of complementarity between capital and labor has to be
higher than between capital and the fixed factor. De Mooij and Bovenberg (1998)
interpret k as energy and f  as fixed capital. (7) then amounts to assuming that labor is a
poorer substitute for energy than capital. According to De Mooij et al. this is supported by
empirical evidence. Moreover, G ≡ 0 if the direct elasticity of substitution is constant
(CES). Given (7), we obtain
Proposition 3: With a uniform income tax, ρ τ ≡− 1 , and I > 0 it is optimal to subsidize 
capital, θ < 0.
Since Proposition 3 can be subsumed as a special case of Proposition 10, the proof is
postponed. Proposition 3 relates to Richter and Schneider (1999), and can be interpreted
as follows. The uniform income tax is an instrument that taxes profit income, π , capital8
income, I, and wage income. Let us ignore profit income for a moment, which leaves us
with two sources of income. The source-based subsidy on capital can be interpreted as an
instrument to discriminate indirectly between labor and capital income. Raising the
uniform income-tax rate marginally produces benefits and costs. On the one hand, there
are costs from distorting labor supply, and on the other hand, there are benefits from
skimming off lumpsum income without causing distortions. The costs of taxation are
reduced if the marginal revenue is used to subsidize capital. The subsidy induces an
inflow of capital, which positively affects labor demand. Note that even if the exogenous
component I is zero, it may still be optimal to subsidize capital. This is the case if G is
strictly positive which, however, excludes a CES production technology.
Let us now consider profit income. As known from Proposition 2, it is optimal to
indirectly reduce profits by taxing capital, given that earned profit income cannot be
taxed. This insight contrasts with the subsidization result of Proposition 3. Obviously, the
reason for indirectly reducing profits by taxing capital must be dominated by other
considerations if a uniform income tax is in place. This is indeed the case. A regime with
income and capital taxation allows to choose between skimming off profit income
directly and reducing the generation of profits indirectly via capital taxation. Given (7),
the former is the more efficient way to do.
A variety of assumptions of the model in Section 2 has been relaxed in the
literature to test the robustness of the production-efficiency theorem.
2 Imperfect labor
markets, however, have - to our knowledge - not explicitly been the subject of such a test.
Hence, this paper addresses the question to what extent labor market imperfections
invalidate Propositions 1-3. In the following sections different scenarios of the labor
market are integrated, and the optimal tax on capital is determined. To get a better
understanding of the forces at work, only rather polar labor market distortions are studied.
In particular, only labor markets in which one side – demand or supply – can exert market
power are studied. Figure 1 illustrates the imperfections modeled in Sections 3-5. First, a
monopsony in the labor market is discussed. Second, it is assumed that labor supply is
controlled by a monopoly union. In Section 5, we finally study some general effects of
unemployment compensation and transfer payments on optimal tax structures.
                                             
2 See discussion in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p.472).9
Insert Figure 1.
3. Monopsony in the labor market
Assume that the labor market is not competitively organized. Instead it is
controlled by a monopsonist. A monopsonist is not facing a horizontal labor supply curve,
but an upward sloping market supply curve.
3 To expand her work force, the monopsonist
has to pay higher wages.
The monopsonist maximizes profits by choosing capital, labor, and the wage rate
subject to the labor supply function:
[] max ( , ) ( )
,, klw
Fkl w l q k −− + 1 θ
subject to () ' ( ) 1−= τ wV l .
Solving this maximization, we obtain (5) and
() 1−= + τω Fl V l " . ( ) α (4’)
The monopsonist hires labor up to the point where the marginal product equals marginal
cost. In doing so, she drives a wedge, lV"/( ) 1− τ , between the marginal product of labor
and labor cost. Rewriting the wedge, we get lV w s "/( ) / 1−= τη , where η s is the
elasticity of labor supply. Thus the wedge and hence the inefficiency is decreasing in the
elasticity of labor supply. If labor supply is perfectly elastic, the monopsonist cannot exert
monopoly power.
The tax planner solves (2)-(6), where (4’) is substituted for (4). Note that to solve




βγ ρ :( ) =−1 k ,( 8 )
                                             
3 For a survey of the literature on monopsony models see Boal and Ransom (1997). Boal and Ransom argue that the single buyer
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Setting ρ ρ == '0  in (10) gives
Proposition 4: If there is no restriction in the taxation of positive lumpsum income, 
ρ ≡ 0, it remains optimal to leave capital untaxed.
Proposition 4 shows that if monopsony profits can be taxed just like other lumpsum
income, capital should remain untaxed. This is well in line with the literature. A
monopsonist earns private profits and, given that profits can be taxed, the production-
efficiency theorem applies.
4 The inefficiency in the labor market does not affect the
validity of Proposition 1. The next two scenarios consider situations in which monopsony
profits cannot be skimmed off completely. First look at a tax regime in which wage
income is the only income taxable at the household level.
Proposition 5: With a pure wage tax, ρ ≡ 1, it is optimal to tax capital.
To see this, set ρ = 1 and ρ '= 0 in (10), and the result follows. Proposition 5 generalizes
Proposition 2. Recall the interpretation of Proposition 2: A tax on capital can serve as an
indirect means to skim off profits, when profits are not directly taxable. The existence of
monopsony profits only strengthens the reason for taxing capital. This effect is captured












 in (10), which does not appear if there is perfect
competition in the labor market. For given employment, l, the monopsony wedge,
Fw l V l −= − "/( ) 1 τ , increases in τ . Hence shifting taxes from labor to capital helps to
reduce the monopsony wedge and to increase labor market efficiency. If capital and labor
                                             
4 Dasgupta and Stiglitz  (1972) show that production efficiency is desirable even if non-constant returns to scale  in the private
sector  give rise to profits, as long as profits can be taxed up to one hundred percent.11
were substitutes, Flk < 0, taxing capital would have an increasing effect on the
monopsony wedge. In this case the optimal sign of θ  would be ambiguous. Note to derive
(10) we did not use the fact that labor and the net wage rate are endogenous variables.
Koskela, Schöb, and Sinn (1998) derive a result which is related to Proposition 5.
Their model is more complex than ours. It allows for imperfectly competitive behavior in
both, the product and the labor market. The authors are able to prove that taxing the
internationally mobile factor boosts employment, provided that the elasticity of
substitution between labor and the mobile factor is not too inelastic. Because the model is
rather complex, it is not really clear which specific assumption is driving the result.
However, Koskela et al. assume that profits cannot be taxed, which according to our
Proposition 5 calls for a tax on capital.
Let us now turn to a uniform income tax regime:
Proposition 6: Consider a uniform income tax with ρ τ ≡− 1 . In the optimum
(i) θ  is positive if I = 0 and if production is CES;
(ii) the sign of θ  is ambiguous if I > 0 or G > 0.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows immediately from rewriting (10):

























From Proposition 3 we know that it is efficient to subsidize capital if positive lumpsum
income is subject to a uniform income tax. This is captured by the last two terms in the
square brackets in (10’). The first term is the monopsony effect, which works in the
opposite direction, i.e., favoring a tax on capital. Reducing monopsony power requires to
tax capital and to use the revenue to lowerτ . In general, nothing can be said about the
sign of θ , unless we know which effect is dominating. This is captured by statement (ii)
of Proposition 6. With a CES technology and no exogenous capital income the ambiguity
is resolved. The last two terms in brackets in (10’) vanish. Only the monopsony effect
determines the sign of θ . This is part (i).
Propositions 5 and 6 are the only results in the paper, where assuming quasi-
linearity of utility is important. Without the assumption of quasi-linearity the after tax12
monopsony wedge, ( )( ) 1−− τ Fw l , is no longer only a function of labor, l. Instead, it
also depends on τ  and θ . As a consequence, tax policy affects labor supply via income
effects. This complication is ruled out by quasi-linearity.
Summarizing Propositions 5 and 6, we conclude that the existence of monopsony
profits is a reason for taxing capital. Note however that the argument has third-best
character. The optimal tax on capital is zero if profits are directly taxable.
4. Monopoly union
In the previous section we derived the optimal tax on capital when labor demand is
a monopoly. Next, we allow for monopoly power of labor supply. Labor supply is
monopolized if a union chooses the amount of labor and the wage rate maximizing a
representative member’s utility, taking the aggregate labor demand schedule as given. For
simplicity let every worker in the economy be a member of the union. In the following
firms are not organized but behave perfectly competitive, and the union does not
negotiate with every firm. Moreover, it is assumed that the union is not fully rational in
the sense that it does not internalize adjustments in profit income resulting from its wage
policy. Formally, the monopoly union maximizes
() ( ) 1−− τ wl V l    in l, k, w subject to   wF l =    and   () 1+= θ qF k .
Maximization implies
( ) ωη 1−= d V', (λ ) (3’)





FF F =− ∈ 2 01 ( , ) denotes the inverse of the wage elasticity of
labor demand. Compared with a competitive outcome the union chooses a wage that is
too high. Following the terminology of Section 3, call the difference between the net
wage and the marginal disutility of labor the monopoly wedge.
5 Since the wedge, ηω d ,
                                             
5 It is well known that the resulting equilibrium is not an efficient contract. There are employment/wage combinations where at
least one party can be made better off without making the other party worse off. Efficient contracts can be reached when both
parties bargain about wages and employment. It might be argued that collective bargaining yields efficient contracts, but it is
nevertheless useful to study the optimal tax schemes with a monopoly union. See McDonald and Solow (1981) and Oswald
(1985).13
is positive, there is equilibrium unemployment in the sense, that at the given wage each
worker is willing to supply more labor.
The following results show that the sign of η∂ η ∂ k
dd k ≡ /  determines the sign of
the optimal θ . More precisely, it turns out that whenever η k
d < 0 we get an argument for
subsidizing capital. In other words, when the market power of the union diminishes with
more employment of capital, capital should – other things equal – be subsidized. If the
market power of the union, however, increases in the employment of capital, a tax on
capital is optimal.
Assuming the tax planner acts as a Stackelberg leader
6, she solves (2) - (6), where
(3’) is substituted for (3). Note that the maximization of (2)-(6) is a special case with
η d ≡ 0. As a result, the proofs of Propositions 1 to 3 follow by simply setting η k
d = 0 in
the proofs of Propositions 8 to 10 below. Turning to first-order conditions of the
planner’s optimization we obtain (8) just as before. Using (4), (9) reduces to










IF l '  . (9’)
Differentiating the Lagrangean with respect to capital k yields
() () () ( ) [] γθ γ ρ ρ τ π λωη ql F k F I F F lk kk lk l k
d =− − + − − + + 11 ' . (11)




λη γ ρ π :( ) () ' 11 −= − −+ d
l lI F  .
To determine the sign of the optimal tax on capital in the presence of a monopoly
union, have a closer look at (11). The effect of union power is captured by the last term. It
vanishes in two important cases. The obvious one is when labor supply is perfectly
competitive, so that ηη d
k
d ≡= 0 . However, η k
d  vanishes as well if the elasticity of
substitution is constant in production, i.e.,  [] Fa l b k f ss s
=++ −− − 1/
. This follows
                                             
6 In Palokangas (1987) it is argued that it is appropriate to model the interaction between the government and the union such that
the government acts as a Stackelberg leader. Cournot conjectures are assumed in Fuest and Huber (1997).14









, which is obviously independent
of k.
Proposition 7:
(i)  If production is CES, union power does not vary with the employment of 
capital. As a result, union power may be ignored when determining the optimal θ .
(ii) If union power decreases (increases) with the employment of capital, which 
obviously requires the elasticity of substitution to be non-constant in
production, this constitutes a reason for subsidizing (taxing) capital.
Part (ii) follows immediately from (11). Let us next evaluate (11) for each of the
considered tax regimes.
Proposition 8: If there are no restrictions in the taxation of positive lumpsum income,
ρ ≡ 0, it is optimal to set θ =
<
>





The proof is straightforward. For ρ ≡ 0 the last term, λωη k
d , is the only one which might
not vanish in (11). Proposition 1 is an immediate corollary just as Propositions 2 and 3 are
immediate corollaries to Propositions 9 and 10 below.
Consider next a pure wage tax. From (11) we get
( ) ( ) γθ γ λωη ql F k F lk kk k
d =− − + + 1  . (11’)
Using (1) and η k
d ≥ 0 gives
Proposition 9: Consider a pure wage tax, ρ ≡ 1. If the market power of the union is 
increasing in the employment of capital, it is optimal to tax capital. The sign of the 
optimal tax on capital is ambiguous if the market power of the union is strictly 
decreasing in the employment of capital.15
Proposition 9 extends Proposition 2 to the case of imperfectly competitive labor supply.
Clearly, the sign of the optimal θ  is ambiguous if union power is strictly decreasing in
the employment of capital. Whether this is the case or not is an empirical question. Note
however, that any variation in union power requires the elasticity of substitution to be
non-constant in production.
Proposition 9 helps to interpret the simulation results of Holmlund and Kolm
(1997). These authors examine the effects of an environmental tax reform within a richly
structured model of a small open economy. The model allows for decentralized wage
bargaining between unions and monopolistically competitive firms. It includes a tradable
and a non-tradable sector. The available tax instruments are an energy tax and a payroll
tax. Finally, the unemployed receive unemployment compensation, which is tied to real
net wages. The model is rather complex – it is even more complex than the one of
Koskela, Schöb, and Sinn (1998) – and has to be solved by simulation. On balance, the
results do not support the case for an environmental tax reform. However, there are
parameter constellations for which a marginal tax on energy enhances efficiency. It is not
easy to identify the driving forces. In light of the present analysis one may, however,
suggest the following explanation. The desirability of energy taxation will not be driven
by unemployment compensation, as this is tied to real net wages. See Proposition 11,
below. Instead the focus should be on two other features of the model. The first one is the
availability of tax instruments. Wages are taxable, profits not. The second one is the
bargaining power of unions. Holmlund and Kolm are only able to demonstrate the
desirability of a marginal tax on energy if a wage premium is paid in the tradable sector.
In this case the energy tax has the effect of reducing the bargaining power of the unions
by inducing a reallocation of employment from the tradable to the non-tradable sector.
This is just the combination of assumptions underlying Proposition 9: Positive lumpsum
income is not taxable and the bargaining power of labor supply increases with the
employment of capital/energy.
As before let us conclude this section by studying the effect of a uniform income
tax. Using ρ τ ≡− 1  and ρ '=− 1 equation (11) becomes
() () [] γθ γ τ λωη qG I F F lk l k
d =− − − + + 1 1  . (11’’)16
Proposition 10: Consider a uniform income tax with ρ τ ≡− 1 . If the union power is 
decreasing in the employment of capital, it is optimal to subsidize capital. If the 
union power is strictly increasing in the employment of capital, the sign of the 
optimal tax on capital is ambiguous.
The proof follows from (11’’) by inserting η k
d ≤ 0. G and I are non-negative by
assumption.
To be a more realistic description of unionized labor markets, the analysis could
and should be extended to wage bargaining models, but the important result of the present
section is that market power of a union can only justify a tax on capital if union power is
sufficiently increasing with the employment of capital.
7
5. Unemployment benefits
The previous sections have shown how taxes on capital are set optimally if labor
market competition is imperfect. However, we did not explicitly account for the cost of
unemployment. This is of course not appropriate, since unemployed workers receive
unemployment compensation in industrialized countries. Moreover, the utility of the
unemployed cannot be simply ignored by a government, when economic policy is
designed. To make the analysis as straightforward as possible, let labor markets be
perfectly competitive but assume that, in addition to paying for public goods, the
government also pays unemployment benefits to those who are not employed. This is an
admittedly artificial separation. The benefit system obviously also affects the wage-
setting behavior of a union. Similarly, the existence of benefits can be viewed as a
reaction of the government to labor-market imperfections.
Following Pissarides (1998), let l be the time a representative worker is employed.
Given a total endowment of time l , ll − denotes the time out of work. As in the previous
sections, being employed yields an income ω l and causes disutility  () Vl. When
                                             
7 Fuest and Huber (1997) model the interaction between the government and the union as a Cournot game. If the government
takes the gross wage as given, it is optimal to subsidize capital. Fuest and Huber also explore the scenario where the government
takes a Stackelberg leadership. For this case they fail, however, to derive clear-cut results for the sign of the optimal capital
tax/subsidy. Boeters and Schneider (1999) distinguish between Cournot and Stackelberg conjectures on the one hand, and
rational and not fully rational unions on the other hand. They show that assuming a constant elasticity of labor demand results in
zero taxes on capital in either case.17
unemployed the worker enjoys leisure time but receives unemployment benefits that are
lower than the income while employed.
8 Let Bl lw (, , ) − τ  denote the benefit function. At
this point the benefit function B is kept in a rather general form. It depends on the extent
of unemployment, the gross-wage rate w, and the wage tax, τ . Later on we put more
structure on the benefit function to show how the design of a transfer system affects the
optimal tax on capital.
The social welfare function needs to be modified to account for the utility of
employment and unemployment. Hence (2) is replaced by
( ) ( ) ωρ π
ω
τ





Unemployment benefits are assumed to be part of government expenditure, and the
government’s budget constraint reads
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In (6’), the level of g is exogenously given, but B is endogenous and therefore total
government spending. Consider what happens to expenditure B when time of











The tax rate τ  has to adapt in order to keep ( ) 1− τ Fl constant, as is required by (3) and















can be interpreted as an external effect from the use of capital on unemployment benefit.
Optimal taxation of capital has to internalize this effect. This follows from maximizing
(2’) subject to the constraints (3) to (5) and (6’). The first-order necessary conditions with
respect to θτ, , and k are (8),
                                             
8 An alternative model that might be intuitively more appealing could include heterogeneous labor.18
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Except for the last term, (13) equals (11). Looking at (13), it turns out that the impact of
unemployment compensation and income taxation, as captured by the last and the first
two bracketed expressions, are perfectly separable. Hence we focus on the effect of
unemployment compensation. The first thing to note is that the fiscal externality
dB dk l const / =  vanishes under well-specified conditions.
Proposition 11: Given that unemployment compensation does
(i)  not depend on wages, Bb ll ≡− () ;
(ii) or, if it does, only on net wages, Bb w ll ≡− − () () 1 τ , then capital has no 
      external effect on government spending.








τ  when B is specified according to
(i) or (ii). The fiscal externality does not vanish when unemployment compensation is tied
to gross wages. If Bb w ll =− ( ), we get B
w




τ ( ), which is positive for all
b>0.
Proposition 12: If unemployment benefits are tied to gross wages, with Bb w ll =− () ,
and if either lump-sum income can be fully taxed or if a wage-tax regime applies,
then it is optimal to tax capital. With a uniform income tax the sign of the optimal
tax on capital is ambiguous.19
Propositions 11 and 12 show that as long as unemployment benefits or other
transfer payments depend on net wages or are not wage-indexed at all, second-best
solutions result, and Propositions 1-3 apply. If, however, transfer payments are indexed to
gross wages, only third-best solutions are attainable, and it may be optimal to tax capital,
even if the taxation of lump-sum income is not constrained.
This result has strong policy implications. First, there are countries, in which
transfer payments are pegged to gross wages. Those countries can reap efficiency gains
from reforming the welfare system and let all transfer payments depend on net wages.
However, that implies secondly that in an efficiently designed welfare system
internationally mobile factors are untaxed.
The labor market studied in this section does not – except for the public transfer
payments – suffer from imperfections. Nevertheless it is possible and useful to extend the
discussion to models that allow for imperfect labor markets. The relevance of the benefit
system on the working of the labor market has already been addressed in the literature. In
various models of unemployment it can be shown that whenever unemployment
compensation is indexed to net wages, a change in labor taxes has no effect on
equilibrium unemployment. With benefits that are fixed to labor costs, however, the
conclusion changes.
Results that are close in spirit to Propositions 11 and 12 have been obtained by
Koskela and Schöb (1996) in a wage bargaining model and by Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg (1995) in a job-search model. A tax on capital has the effect of shifting part of the
tax burden from the employed to the unemployed. It does so by reducing labor
productivity and gross wages. The reduction in gross wages is partly offset by lower wage
taxes for the employed. If unemployment payments are indexed to gross wages, they
decrease as well. However, unemployment pay does not benefit from lower labor taxes.
Thus the tax on capital helps to increase the difference between labor income and
unemployment compensation, thereby enhancing the efficiency of the system. Related to
this literature is Pissarides (1998), who concludes that in a competitive labor market
cutting employment taxes has a bigger impact on employment when the ratio of
unemployment benefits to gross wages is fixed than when the net replacement ratio is
fixed.20
6. Application: Ecological tax reform
An application of the analysis is the discussion about an ecological tax reform and
possible double dividends from revenue recycling. It has been argued by politicians but
also by economists that environmental taxes might yield efficiency gains over and above
gains from reducing an externality. The basic idea is that tax revenue from environmental
taxes can be used to reduce the distortions created by other taxes. In particular, positive
employment effects of a tax reform would be welcomed. The theoretical results of this
debate are mixed. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994a) show that in an economy with full
employment and a consumption externality the second-best tax on the polluting good is
less than the Pigouvian tax, thereby refuting the double-dividend hypothesis. This result
has been criticized because the model did not explicitly account for unemployment. In
fact, it has been shown in various papers, that an existing inefficient tax system can be
(marginally) reformed such that unemployment is reduced (e.g., Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg, 1995; Koskela and Schöb, 1996; Koskela, Schöb, and Sinn, 1998).
In the public discussion of green tax reforms it is typically argued that taxes on
energy should be substituted for taxes on labor. The idea is enjoying increasing
popularity, as the proposal of the European Commission (1997) suggests. Energy,
however, is an internationally traded input like mobile capital. Hence the non-ecological
effects of taxing energy as a production input are qualitatively the same as the effects of
taxing internationally mobile capital. This implies that the double-dividend hypothesis is
validated if, and only if, reasons can be found for taxing capital at source.
The present paper raises the question of whether it is efficient to tax capital at
source when labor markets suffer from various imperfections and the taxation of
lumpsum income is constrained. While the analysis gives no final answer, it sheds light
on potential reasons favoring the taxation of capital - hence supporting the double-
dividend hypothesis. The following reasons have been identified: (i) institutional
constraints rendering any taxation of profit income infeasible; (ii) market power in the
demand for labor in combination with (i); (iii) market power in the supply of labor which
increases with the employment of capital and thus requires a non-constant elasticity of21
substitution in production; finally (iv) unemployment benefits which are tied to gross
wages. We would argue that none of these reasons make a particularly strong case for
taxing internationally mobile factors. In fact, arguments against (i)-(iv) are readily at
hand. The existence of a uniform income tax for once violates (i). Similarly, reason (ii) is
considerably weakened, once the existence of positive capital income in combination with
a uniform income tax is accounted for. Reason (iii) may raise questions that have to be
settled empirically. Note however that a non-constant of elasticity of substitution in
production might not be the kind of assumption to rely on, when defending an
environmental tax reform. Moreover, as argued in Richter and Schneider (1999), there is
empirical evidence that with varying elasticities of substitution the conditions derived in
the paper support subsidies on energy rather than taxes. Finally (iv) requires more than
anything else, to reform unemployment compensation. Hence it all comes down to the
question whether various sources of income can be taxed at differentiated rates. If
differentiated taxation is feasible, efficiency requires to skim off pure profits directly
rather than to tax mobile factors at source. If, however, all income has to be taxed at a
uniform rate, then it is highly questionable whether a double dividend can be reaped from
taxing the employment of mobile factors. As mentioned before, the role of unemployment
compensation for the effectiveness of green tax reforms has well been examined in the
literature. The effects of existing constraints in the taxation of positive lumpsum income,
however, seem to be less recognized.
Clearly, applying the present model to the double-dividend debate does not
acknowledge that capital and energy are both internationally mobile factors of production.
However, introducing internationally mobile capital with no constraints on the taxation of
capital is not going to affect the results of the paper regarding the tax treatment of private
energy consumption and the use of energy in production. The results of the analysis
presented here might no longer hold when mobile capital is taxed and the tax on capital is
treated to be exogenous.
7. Conclusions
The paper addresses the question of whether it is efficient to tax capital at source
when labor markets and the tax system suffers from imperfections. The answers given in22
this paper are rather mixed. In Section 2 we have shown that the optimal treatment of
capital critically depends on the availability of instruments that allow the government to
tax lumpsum income earned by households. In Sections 3 and 4 rudimentary forms of
imperfections in labor market competition have been studied. Section 5 has focused on
distortions caused by unemployment compensation. Clearly, the selection of labor market
imperfections is far from being complete, and we do not claim that any of the chosen
models reflects reality. They just serve as benchmark cases and may help to get a better
understanding of the driving forces in more structured models of unemployment. There is
a number of useful extensions of the model. For example, the presented model is a static
model, hence the effect of capital taxation on incentives to accumulate capital are not
accounted for. Furthermore, labor market imperfections are accounted for, capital market
imperfections are ignored. Moreover, it could be interesting to look at a model with
structural unemployment resulting from search frictions. Work by Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg (1995) could be a good starting point.
Figure 1 illustrates the various sources of labor market imperfections analyzed in
this paper. First-best efficiency requires equality between the marginal product and the
marginal disutility of labor. It is second-best to accept a tax wedge between the two when
labor markets are perfectly competitive and when lumpsum taxes are not available to
finance a fixed government budget. Taxes on capital, however, are not second-best. They
are optimal in some third-best sense only if the government is restricted to tax wage
income and to leave all positive lumpsum income untaxed. Imperfections in labor market
competition provide further reasons for taxing capital as part of a third-best policy. We
have studied two extreme cases of market power, a monopsony and a monopoly. A
monopsonist drives a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the labor cost,
generating profit income. If there is no direct way of taxing profits, we should consider to
tax capital. However, if a uniform income tax is available, the policy implication is
ambiguous.
The labor supply monopoly drives a wedge between the net wage rate and the
marginal disutility of labor. As it turns out, it is optimal to tax capital only if monopoly
power increases with the employment of capital. Variation with the employment of23
capital requires the elasticity of substitution to be non-constant in production. Hence, a
monopoly is more apt to support the subsidization of capital than the taxation of capital.
In Section 5 of the paper the focus is on the transfer system with a competitive
labor market. As long as transfer payments are tied to gross wages a tax on capital is
third-best. However, it is efficiency improving to tie transfer payments to net wages and
not to tax capital.
The results of the paper are surprisingly clear cut. The assumptions made allow to
identify the major factors determining optimal tax treatment of capital. At this point we
conclude that the case for taxing capital is anything but compelling. As indicated above,
much of the discussion surrounding the double-dividend hypothesis might be interpreted
along these lines.
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Figure 1: Distortions of the labor market